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ARGUMENTS 
Chad R. Moore and Melanie S. Moore filed their brief on October 14, 2005 as 
intervenors in this court's review of the Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals entered 
January 21, 2005 pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari granted August 9, 2005. David J. Allen, 
the Petitioner, herein files his response to the brief of the Moores. 
The Moores have adopted the arguments of Thomas K. Hall, the Respondent in this 
action, inasmuch as they find themselves in the same situation having ignored the Utah 
recording statute. 
I. THE RECORDING STATUTE IS NOT DEFEATED BY EQUITABLE DEFENSES. 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Mr. Allen had a right of reversion in the Flanders 
Property which was described in the 1993 quitclaim deed to Ms. Satterfield and which 
became a fee simple in July 1999 when Ms. Satterfield moved to North Carolina. The Court 
of Appeals also ruled that Mr. Hall had notice of the right of reversion pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §57-3-102 and that this notice destroyed any equitable grounds upon which Mr. Hall 
might claim to defeat Mr. Allen's right to the Flanders Property. 
The Moores argue that the Court of Appeals should be reversed because equitable 
defenses can defeat the recording statute and Mr. Allen's claim to the Flanders Property. 
The Moores are not entitled to make this argument at this stage of the proceedings, and even 
if this court allows them leave to do so, the ruling of the Court of Appeals is the correct 
statement of the law. 
A. Intervenors May Not Challenge the Decision of the Court of Appeals Quieting 
Title to the Flanders Property in Mr. Allen. 
1 
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in this matter on January 21,2005. Mr. Allen 
filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this court on April 11, 2005. The Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was granted on August 9,2005 as to the following issues: (i) Mr. Allen's 
obligation to Mr. Hall under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, (ii) Mr. Allen's obligation 
to Homecomings under the Decree of Divorce, and (iii) Mr. Allen's claim against Mr. Hall 
and Homecomings for unjust enrichment. 
The Moores filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene with this Court on May 13,2005 
and their Motion was granted on October 11, 2005. 
This court's cases have treated postjudgment motions to intervene unfavorably, 
articulating a "general rule" that "intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment." 
Jenner v. Real Estate Servs.. 659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983). 
The Court of Appeals decided the issue of title to the Flanders Property on January 
21, 2005 and determined that title to the Flanders Property be quieted in Mr. Allen. This 
court did not grant certiorari on the issue of ownership of the Flanders Property, nor did the 
Moores raise that issue in their Motion for Leave to Intervene. Therefore, the issue of 
ownership of the Flanders Property has been determined by a final judgment and intervention 
by the Moores on this issue should not be allowed. 
Exceptions to the court's general rule on postjudgment intervention have been made 
only where an applicant for intervention makes a "strong showing of entitlement and 
justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as will justify the failure to seek 
intervention earlier." Id (footnotes omitted). This exception standard is far beyond the reach 
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of the Moores. On or about November 26, 2002, Mr. Allen caused a Lis Pendens to be 
recorded on the Flanders Property in the offices of the Salt Lake County Recorder as entry 
number 8434404, book 8690, page 9042. The Lis Pendens gives notice of the pendency of 
Mr. Allen's appeal of the Third District Court ruling regarding the Flanders Property. The 
Moores did not attempt to purchase the Flanders Property from BankOne as Trustee for 
Homecomings until approximately July 28, 2004. Consequently, at all relevant times the 
Moores had notice pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102 of Mr. Allen's right to a 
reversionary interest in the Flanders Property and his appeal to enforce those rights. Thus, 
there are no unusual or compelling circumstances as a basis for the Moores to raise the issue 
of ownership at this time. 
The Moores have no standing to challenge or object to Mr. Allen's ownership of the 
Flanders Property as decided by the Utah Court of Appeals and therefore no basis upon 
which to intervene in this appeal. 
Further, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 24 requires that a motion to intervene "be 
accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is 
sought." Utah R. Civ. P. 24(c). The Moores' Motion for Leave to Intervene was improper 
because it was not accompanied by any pleading identifying an intent to intervene on the 
issue of Mr. Allen's title to the Flanders Property. Absent any such pleading, the Moores' 
intervention in this case should be limited to the specific issues upon which the writ of 
certiorari was granted. 
B. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied the Recording Statute. 
3 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Mr. Hall had notice of the right of reversion pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §57-3-102 and that this notice destroyed any equitable grounds upon 
which Mr. Hall might claim to defeat Mr. Allen's right to the Flanders Property. This is the 
correct statement of the law. Amazingly, the Moores are reduced to making the same 
arguments made by Mr. Hall to the trial court because the Moores, like Mr. Hall, apparently 
ignored the recording statute when they attempted to purchase the Flanders Property and do 
not want to be responsible for their own actions. Mr. Hall and the Moores have no one to 
blame but themselves when the Flanders Property reverts to Mr. Allen. 
If this court determines to allow the Moores to challenge the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals quieting fee simple title to the Flanders Property in Mr. Allen in July 1999, then 
the Moores' challenge must be denied for the same reasons that the Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court. 
The Moores adopt the theme of the trial court in attempting to shift the blame for Mr. 
Hall's loss, and the subsequent loss of the Moores, to Mr. Allen. The Moores do so by 
asserting (i) that Mr. Allen had a duty to notify Mr. Hall of the right of reversion and (ii) that 
equitable defenses defeat the notice given under the recording statute. 
The Moores and the trial court assert that Mr. Allen knew that Mr. Hall would 
mortgage and improve the Flanders Property. There is no evidence to support any such 
assertion and it is error. While Mr. Allen became aware that Ms. Satterfield had sold the 
Flanders Property to Mr. Hall, that knowledge alone cannot be construed to attribute 
knowledge of actual refinancing or actual improvement to the Flanders Property. Indeed. 
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even if Mr. Allen knew that Mr. Hall might mortgage the Flanders Property, Mr. Allen would 
have also reasonably believed that any mortgagee of the Flanders Property would have 
knowledge of Mr. Allen's right of reversion and would know that any security interest 
claimed in the Flanders Property would be subject thereto. Likewise, even if Mr. Allen 
knew that Mr. Hall might improve the Flanders Property, Mr. Allen would reasonably 
believed that Mr. Hall would have knowledge that his improvements, like his title to the 
Flanders Property, would be subject to Mr. Allen's right of reversion. 
Mr. Allen had no knowledge that Mr. Hall was improving the Flanders Property. Mr. 
Allen entered the Flanders Property a few days after it was sold to Mr. Hall in January 1998 
to retrieve some personal effects. Mr. Allen has not entered the Flanders Property since then. 
There was no evidence offered that Mr. Hall commenced his improvements to the Flanders 
Property prior to Mr. Allen's entry thereon nor that Mr. Hall made any improvements to the 
Flanders Property after title reverted to Mr. Allen in July 1999. 
The Moores and the trial court are wrong in asserting Mr. ''Allen's silence, delay and 
inactivity to be intentional and designed to enhance the value and equity of the [Property]" 
to Hall's detriment. First, there was no evidence given that Mr. Allen knew that Mr. Hall 
was not aware of the right of reversion. The trial court's findings in this regard are in error 
and unsupported by the evidence. Second, the Moores and the trial court seem to attach some 
weight to the trial court's finding that Mr. Allen "failed to initiate a lawsuit to claim the 
Property for approximately two years." Mr. Hall purchased the property from Ms. Satterfield 
in January 1998. Ms. Satterfield moved from the state of Utah in July 1999, at which time 
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the Flanders Property automatically reverted to Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen notified Mr. Hall of the 
right of reversion on or about January 4, 2000 and when the matter could not be resolved, 
Mr. Allen commenced the lawsuit in May 2000. Prior to July 1999, Mr. Allen had no present 
legal claim or right against Mr. Hall or the Flanders Property. However, the trial court seems 
to think that Mr. Allen should have taken some action immediately following the sale to Mr. 
Hall. The trial court's finding in this regard is in error and unsupported by the evidence. 
The Moores' claim that equitable defenses defeat the recording statute is based on the 
obvious flaw of Mr. Hall's claim that he did not know about the right of reversion. If Mr. 
Hall knew, or should have known about the right of reversion, then the maxim of "unclean 
hands" would preclude him from asserting equitable defenses. As the Court of Appeals 
found, Mr. Hall had knowledge under the recording statute of the right of reversion and 
therefore is precluded from asserting equitable defenses. 
The Moores' attempt to show that Mr. Hall's claimed equitable defenses should be 
sufficient to defeat the recording statute is curious inasmuch as the Moores' defense is being 
provided by the insurer of their title, whose entire industry is based on the certainty of and 
reliance on the recording statutes. Indeed, if the court were to accept the Moores' argument, 
Utah's recording statute would be fundamentally weakened and the status of real property 
titles in Utah would be set in turmoil. 
Mr. Allen had no duty to give notice to Mr. Hall or anyone else of the right of 
reversion. 
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Mr. Allen has done nothing "unjust, inequitable or intolerable." In fact Mr. Allen's 
only act in question here is entering into a property settlement agreement with his former 
spouse and then attempting to enforce that agreement. Mr. Allen did not suggest to Mr. Hall 
or encourage him to refinance the Flanders Property. Indeed, there is no evidence that Mr. 
Allen knew that Mr. Hall was refinancing the Flanders Property. Mr. Allen did not suggest 
to or encourage Mr. Hall to improve the Flanders Property. Indeed, there is not evidence that 
Mr. Allen knew that Mr. Hall was improving the Flanders Property. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Moores claim that equitable defenses defeat the 
recording statute should be denied. 
II. MR. ALLEN IS RESPONSIBLE ONLY FOR THE DEBT WHICH WAS SECURED 
BY THE FLANDERS PROPERTY WHEN MR. ALLEN CONVEYED THE 
FLANDERS PROPERTY TO MS. SATTERFIELD. 
It is settled law in real property that the holder of a terminable interest in real property 
may not affect the rights of a remainderman without the written consent of the 
remainderman. The same holds true in this case. Neither Ms. Satterfield, Mr. Hall, 
Homecomings nor the Moores may affect Mr. Allen's right of reversion to the Flanders 
Property without his written consent. It is also settled law in real property that a grantor may 
not convey more than his interest in real property. Thus, Ms. Satterfield conveyed her fee 
simple title subject to a right of reversion to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall conveyed a security interest 
in his fee simple title subject to a right of reversion to Homecomings. And Homecomings 
conveyed its fee simple title subject to a right of reversion to the Moores. Consequently, 
when the Flanders Property reverted to Mr. Allen in July 1999, all interests of Ms. 
Satterfield, Mr. Hall, Homecomings and the Moores terminated. 
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The trial court was loath to leave Mr. Hall responsible for ignoring the recording 
statute so it attacked the Decree of Divorce between Mr. Allen and Ms. Satterfield in an 
attempt to create a remedy for Mr. Hall and Homecomings. 
A. The Decree of Divorce is a Property Settlement Between Mr. Allen and Ms. 
Satterfield. 
The Moores argue that if Mr. Allen is entitled to the Flanders Property, he must pay 
Homecomings the amount of the indebtedness on the Flanders Property as of July 1999, the 
date the Property reverted to Mr. Allen. The Moore's argument is based solely on an 
interpretation of the Decree of Divorce and not on any principles of real property law. 
Mr. Allen has argued in his principal brief the reasons why the Decree of Divorce 
does not create any obligation for Mr. Allen to satisfy the debt owed by Mr. Hall to 
Homecomings. In addition, Mr. Allen responds further to issues raised by the Moores. 
Mr. Allen purchased the Flanders Property in his own name and he alone signed the 
mortgage note to finance the purchase of the Flanders Property. When Mr. Allen and Ms. 
Satterfield divorced, the Flanders Property was one of the assets of the marital estate. The 
marital value of the Flanders Property at the time of the divorce was its equity, i.e. fair 
market value at the time of the divorce less the mortgage loan balance at the time of the 
divorce. This was further subject to any future increase in the fair market value of the 
Flanders Property and to any future amortization of the mortgage loan balance. 
The Decree of Divorce must be interpreted as the agreement between two parties, Mr. 
Allen and Ms. Satterfield, and not distorted to create a remedy for Mr. Hall and 
Homecomings. 
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Any confusion on the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals regarding what, 
if any, debt Mr. Allen would be responsible for after the Flanders Property reverted to him 
could have been readily clarified from a reading of the final sentence of Paragraph 10 of the 
Decree of Divorce which states that "[t]hese provisions are to ensure that the children have 
a suitable residence during their minority, are structured to provide a benefit to the defendant 
[Satterfield] if she shall continue to reside in Salt Lake City, Utah, in the form of all of the 
equity in said home, and a detriment if she shall move, in the form of the loss of one-half of 
the equity." 
If Ms. Satterfield satisfied the conditions of the right of reversion, all of the Flanders 
Property would be hers. If, on the other hand, Ms. Satterfield were to move, she would 
forfeit half of the value of the Flanders Property. If the trial court's interpretation of the 
Decree of Divorce is accepted, Ms. Satterfield could defeat the intent of the Decree of 
Divorce by refinancing and taking all value out of the Flanders Property. This could not have 
been the intent of Mr. Allen and Ms. Satterfield because their agreement would have been 
rendered a nullity. The Decree of Divorce is to be interpreted to consistent with the express 
language and the intent of the parties, Mr. Allen and Ms. Satterfield. It makes no sense to 
structure a property settlement in a marital dissolution and then read the provision as 
anything other than its intended purpose. 
The only reasonable interpretation of the Decree of Divorce is that if the Flanders 
Property reverts to Mr. Allen, he services the debt until it is sold and then divides the net 
proceeds equally with Ms. Satterfield. The debt which he is to service and satisfy from 
proceeds of the Flanders Property is the amortized balance owed of the debt secured by the 
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Flanders Property at the time of the Decree of Divorce and on which Mr. Allen was 
obligated. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should be reversed and title to the Flanders Property 
should be quieted in Mr. Allen subject only to the amortized balance of the debt secured by 
the Flanders Property at the time of the Decree of Divorce. 
B. The Lower Courts Erred in Determining That Mr. Allen Takes the Flanders 
Property Subject to Any Debt Existing at the Time of the Reversion and Not 
Subject Only to Debt Existing at the Time of the Decree of Divorce. 
The Moores basically make the same arguments in the corresponding section of their 
brief which they make in the preceding section and Mr. Allen raises the same objections to 
those arguments. 
III. MR. ALLEN HAS NO OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR MR. HALL'S 
IMPROVEMENTS TO THE FLANDERS PROPERTY. 
The Moores argue that if Mr. Allen is entitled to the Flanders Property, he must pay 
for Mr. HalFs improvements to the Flanders Property. The Moores base their claim 
alternatively upon the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and upon a theory of unjust 
enrichment. 
The Moores would have this court find that the holder of a terminable interest in real 
property is entitled to be compensated for any improvements made to the real property when 
the interest is terminated by operation of law. This is clearly not the intention of the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act nor have the Moores made their case on the theory of unjust 
enrichment. 
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The Moores ignore the recording statutes and argue that Mr. Allen breached a duty 
to inform Mr. Hall of the right of reversion. The right of reversion was duly recorded and 
gave notice to all the world, except seemingly for Mr. Hall and the Moores. Mr. Allen had 
no duty to inform Mr. Hall or anyone else of the right of reversion. 
The Court of Appeals held that under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act Mr. Allen 
must pay for the improvements of Mr. Hall. Mr. Allen petitioned for a writ of certiorari 
from this court to review the holding of the Court of Appeals and this court granted the writ 
on the issue of "whether an occupant who holds title to property subject to a reversionary 
interest - a s reflected by the 1993 deed in this case - is entitled to compensation for 
improvements under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act and, if so, whether the court of 
appeals properly determined the value of those improvements." 
A. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act Does Not Require Mr. Allen to Pay for 
Mr. Hall's Improvements to the Property. 
There are three requirements under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, all of which 
must be met to support a recovery under the Act. The Moores have advanced their 
arguments in support of each of these requirements having been met. The issue before the 
court can be summarized as the scope and intent of the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. 
(1) Mr. Hall Does Not Have Color of Title. 
The Moores assert the Mr. Hall had "color of title." They argue that Mr. Allen has 
wrongly used the common law definition of "color of title" and ask this court to consider the 
statutory definition as if it were somehow different from the common law definition. 
According to the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, 
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Any person has color of title who has occupied a tract of real estate by himself, 
or by those under whom he claims, for the term of five years, or who has 
occupied it for less time, if he, or those under whom he claims, have at any 
time during the occupancy with the knowledge or consent, express or implied, 
of the real owner made any valuable improvements on the real estate.... 
Utah Code Ann. §57-6-4(2)(a). It is Mr. Allen's position that this definition of "color of 
title" is no different than the common law definition and therefore all of the arguments made 
in his earlier brief are incorporated herein by reference. 
The statutory definition distinguishes between the occupant of real property and the 
real owner of real property. The occupying claimant is not the real owner of the real 
property. This is consistent with the common law definition in that the person claiming 
"color of title" is not the real owner. 
At the time the improvements were made, Mr. Hall was both the occupant of the 
Flanders Property and the real owner of the Flanders Properly. Therefore, under the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act, he has no claim for improvements against anyone but himself 
The Moores boldly claim that Mr. Allen cannot "genuinely contest the fact that he, at 
least impliedly knew of or consented to HalFs making such improvements [to the Flanders 
Property]." This is wrong. There is no evidence that Mr. Allen had any knowledge of Mr. 
Hall's improvements to the Flanders Property. The Moores apparently base their claim on 
the evidence that Mr. Allen entered the Flanders Property two days after the sale to Mr. Hall 
to retrieve personal effects. The Moores surmise from this that Mr. Allen "must have known 
that, as the new owner, Hall would improve the Property." Again, this is wrong and a claim 
not supported by any evidence. 
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The Moores base their argument on the statutory definition of "color of title" arguing 
that Mr. Hall occupied the property with the knowledge and consent of the "real owner" Mr. 
Allen. First, the statutory definition of "color of title" differentiates between an occupant and 
the real owner. The Moores' erroneous presumption here is that Mr. Hall was the occupant 
and that Mr. Allen was the "real owner." In truth, Mr. Hall was the occupant and the real 
owner in fee simple subject to Mr. Allen's right of reversion. No one has argued that Mr. 
Allen became the real owner of the Property until Ms. Satterfield left the state of Utah in July 
1999. Further, no evidence has been offered that any of the improvements were made to the 
Flanders Property after July 1999. Therefore, Mr. Hall did not have color of title to the 
Flanders Property while he was making the improvements thereto. 
(2) Mr. Hall's Improvements to the Flanders Property Were Made While 
He Was the Occupant and Real Owner of the Property. 
Mr. Hall made improvements to the Property. A claimant under the Utah Occupying 
Claimants Act must make valuable improvements on the real estate. Utah Code Ann. §57-6-
1. The Utah Occupying Claimants Act further requires that the complaint of the party 
claiming under that Act "must [emphasis added] set forth the grounds on which the defendant 
seeks relief, stating as accurately as practicable the value of the real estate, exclusive of the 
improvements thereon made by the claimant or his grantors, and the value of such 
Improvements." Utah Code Ann. §57-6-2. Respondent Hall's Amended Answer and 
Amended Counterclaim did neither and therefore his pleading was defective and his claim 
should be denied. [Record at 275] 
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wThe issues joined thereon must be tried as in law actions, and the value of the real 
estate and of such improvements must be separately ascertained on the trial." Utah Code 
Ann. §57-6-2. Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals determined separately the value 
of the real estate, exclusive of any improvements, or the separate value of such 
improvements. 
Thus, based upon Respondent HalFs failure to meet the foregoing requirements of the 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act, there can be no finding of valuable improvements made to 
the Property. 
(3) Mr. Hall Did Not Make His Improvements to the Flanders Property in 
Good Faith. 
Mr. Allen has explained in his brief why Mr. Hall does not meet the necessary 
component of good faith under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act. The Moores counter 
with language from two of the cases cited by Mr. Allen in his brief to show that a good faith 
belief or a reasonable and honest belief of ownership is sufficient to satisfy the good faith 
requirement. See Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998); Ute-Cal Land Dev. 
Corp. v. Sather, 645 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah 1982). What the Moores overlook is that these 
cases, and indeed every other case which applies the Utah Occupying Claimants Act, deal 
with fact situations in which the occupants are not the real owners of the property. In this 
case, Mr. Hall is both the occupant and the real owner of the Flanders Property. As the real 
owner, Mr. Hall had constructive notice of Mr. Allen's right of reversion and so made the 
improvements subject to that right. This precludes Mr. Hall from making a claim that he 
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made the improvement thinking the he would benefit from them beyond the term of his estate 
and title in the Flanders Property. 
Thus, Mr. Hall does not meet any of the three requirements for recovery under the 
Utah Occupying Claimants Act and the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in finding 
otherwise. 
B. Mr. Allen Was Not Unjustly Enriched by the Termination of Mr. Hall's Estate 
in the Flanders Property. 
(1) an Unjust Enrichment Claim Cannot Be Raised at this Stage of the 
Proceedings. 
The Moores attempt to expand the scope of this court's review of the Court of 
Appeals finding concerning the Utah Occupying Claimants Act by asserting an alternative 
claim for unjust enrichment as a basis for Mr. Hall's recovery if he is denied under the Utah 
Occupying Claimants Act. This claim is beyond the scope of the Writ of Certiorari granted 
by this court. For this and the reasons stated in LA. above, the Moores claim that Mr. Allen 
is obligated to pay for Mr. Hall's improvements under a theory of unjust enrichment should 
be denied. 
(2) The Recording Statute Precludes Mr. Hall's Claim of Unjust 
Enrichment. 
The Court of Appeals held that the recording statute applies and therefor the equitable 
remedies are not available. 
(3) Mr. Allen Was Not Unjustly Enriched by Mr. Hall. 
The Moores have identified the three elements necessary to support a claim for unjust 
enrichment. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B & L Auto. Inc.. 2000 UT 83, % 13, 12 P.3d 580. 
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First, there must be a benefit conferred on one person by another. While Mr. Hall 
submitted evidence of approximately $52,000 of improvements to the Flanders Property, all 
of the improvements were made while Mr. Hall was the owner of the Flanders Property and 
before the Flanders Property reverted to Mr. Allen. Thus, at the time the improvements were 
made to the Flanders Property, there was no intent that they would benefit anyone but Mr. 
Hall, the owner of the Flanders Property. The improvements to the Flanders Property did not 
confer a benefit to Mr. Allen. 
By analogy, improvements to real property under a lease become the property of the 
landlord upon termination of the lease without compensation to the tenant. Also, 
improvements made to real property by a life tenant become the property of the 
remainderman without compensation to the life tenant or his heirs. The same reasoning 
should apply in this instance. Improvements made to the Flanders Property by Mr. Hall 
become the property of Mr. Allen upon reversion of the Flanders Property to him, without 
compensation to Mr. Hall. Mr. Hall attempts to circumvent the law by claiming that he is 
somehow protected by his ignorance in not knowing about Mr. Allen's right of reversion. 
But he should not be allowed to do so. The Moores fail to meet this prong of the unjust 
enrichment test. 
Second, the conferee [Mr. Allen] must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. 
If goes without saying that this knowledge must exist at the time the benefit is conferred and 
does not apply to knowledge acquired at some later date. The Moores asserl that Mr. Allen 
knew of Mr. Halfs improvements to the Flanders Property "for years." There is no evidence 
to support this assertion. Mr. Allen did not learn of Mr. Hall's improvements to the Flanders 
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Property until Mr. Hall filed his counterclaim alleging the improvements. Therefore, the 
improvements were not made with the appreciation, knowledge or consent of Mr. Allen and 
the Moores fail to meet this prong of the unjust enrichment test. 
Finally, there must be an acceptance or retention by the conferee [Mr. Allen] of the 
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value. Any benefit to the Flanders Property which resulted 
from Mr. Hall's improvements transferred to Mr. Allen when the Flanders Property reverted 
to him by operation of law, through no action of his own and with knowledge to everyone. 
While it may be unfortunate that Mr. Hall did not have the use and enjoyment of his 
improvements for a longer time, it is not inequitable for the Flanders Property to have 
reverted to Mr. Allen, together with the improvements. Therefore, the Moores fail to meet 
this prong of the unjust enrichment test. 
Even if this court were inclined to consider the Moores' unjust enrichment claim, the 
Moores have not satisfied the requirements of such a claim and therefore it should be denied. 
Further, for the same reasons that the Court of Appeals found that Mr. Hall's equitable 
defenses do not defeat the recording statute, this court should find that Mr. Hall does not 
have a claim for unjust enrichment. 
IV. MR. ALLEN IS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS CLAIM FOR UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. 
Petitioner Allen claimed, and the court of appeals ultimately decided, that the Flanders 
Property automatically reverted to him on or about July 15, 1999. As the owner of the 
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Flanders Property, Mr. Allen has been denied the use and enjoyment of the Flanders Property 
since July 1999, without compensation from Mr. Hall, Homecomings or now the Moores. 
The trial court denied Mr. Allen's claim for the unjust enrichment of Mr. Hall and 
Homecomings. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law, one way or 
the other, respecting this claim of Mr. Allen. However, consistent with the trial court's 
ruling that Mr. Allen had no interest in the Property, the trial court likely considered Mr. 
Allen's claim for restitution of unjust enrichment a nullity. 
Mr. Hall testified that subsequent to July 15, 1999 and until the date of trial he 
personally occupied the Property for part of the time and rented the Property for part of the 
time. Respondent Hall testified that the fair market rental of the Property was between 
$1,200.00 per month and $1,400.00 per month. Record at 642-643. 
Consequently, the denial of Petitioner Allen's claim for restitution of unjust 
enrichment must also be reversed and considered. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner Allen asks this court (i) to deny the Moores' 
request to reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that the Flanders Property reverted to Mr. 
Allen on July 15, 1999; (ii) to reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that Respondent Hall is 
entitled to recovery under the Utah Occupying Claimants Act or, if it is not inclined to do so, 
to reverse the Court of Appeals' ruling that the Utah Occupying Claimants Act was properly 
applied to determine the amount of the recovery to which Mr. Hall is entitled; (iii) to reverse 
the Court of Appeals' ruling that Mr. Allen is responsible for all indebtedness on the Flanders 
Property existing at the time of the reversion and to find that Mr. Allen is entitled to the 
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Property free and clear of all indebtedness excepting an amount equal to the amortized 
balance of the indebtedness on the Flanders Property at the date of the Decree of Divorce; 
and (iv) to reverse the denial of Mr. Allen's claim of unjust enrichment and remand the same 
to the trial court for reconsideration consistent with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that 
ownership of the Property reverted to Mr. Allen on July 15, 1999. 
DATED: December 19, 2005. SWENSEN & ANDERSEN PLLC 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Attorneys for Petitioner DavicM. Allen 
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